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Superannuation is the Commonwealth Government’s preferred system for the provision 
of income in retirement. Generous taxation concessions together with legislated 
employer compulsory contributions underpin recent growth in the coverage of 
superannuation. By definition, occupational superannuation benefits those with a 
strong attachment to the workforce. Employment in a part-time capacity and, or, a low-
paid, low status occupation places a significant constraint on the capacity of individuals 
to accumulate retirement savings. The policy shift towards this form of retirement 
income system thus has particular adverse consequences for women. Using micro-
simulations this paper estimates the final lump-sum that women with a range of 
different work and other characteristics could expect to save under a Superannuation 
Guarantee accumulation arrangement. Adequacy assessments suggest that, even under 
a fully-matured SGC system, a typical woman will remain heavily dependent on the age 
pension in retirement. The results highlight the need for greater public debate over 
government policy with respect to the whole retirement income system rather than a 




Since the mid 1980s there has been a policy shift to extend private 
superannuation coverage to a broad group of labour market participants. 
Minimum compulsory employer superannuation contributions are now 
provided for under the Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC) Act 1992.  
Generous taxation concessions have also been used to encourage and promote 
private contributions to superannuation schemes.i It is widely believed that the 
combined effect of these policies will be a reduction in reliance on the 
government provided, means-tested, age pension. 
 
# The results reported in this paper derive from a larger report (Austen, Jefferson and Preston, 
2001) prepared for the West Australian Women’s Policy Office.  We would like to thank the WPO 
for financial support and permission to publish the results in this forum. We also acknowledge 
the valued comments and suggestions received from WPO and Ms Joan Malpass in particular. 
The paper was presented at the 2001 National Social Policy Conference, Sydney, 4-6 July.  
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While the SGC and taxation provisions do offer an opportunity for many  retirees 
to achieve an increased income in retirement, occupational superannuation, by 
definition, benefits those with a strong labour market attachment. Those outside 
the labour market or with a weak attachment to the workforce are likely to be 
most disadvantaged by the arrangements. In this respect the framework 
underpinning the government’s current retirement income system is gender 
biased. A woman’s capacity to secure an adequate retirement income within the 
system is significantly constrained by her traditional role as ‘wife and mother’ 
which, for many, results in financial dependence on a partner, broken work 
patterns, and employment in low paying jobs, often of a part-time/casual nature. 
 
In the remainder of this paper lifetime micro-simulation models that estimate the 
superannuation savings of women with typical patterns of involvement in the 
paid workforce are developed. The models are used to examine the capacity for 
women to achieve an adequate income in retirement under the current system. 
The results suggest that, even with significant changes in the current labour 
market attachment behaviour of women, their ability to achieve a sufficient 
retirement income under a system based on occupational superannuation will 
remain significantly constrained.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
current retirement income system. Section 3 details the methodology used to 
construct the micro-simulation models. Simulation results are presented in 
Section 4 with an assessment of the adequacy of women’s retirement income to 
meet their basic needs in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Australian Retirement Income System 
 
The Australian retirement income system has three main pillars or strands: the 
age pension, which is a means tested, flat rate, non-contributory payment funded 
from government general revenue; private occupational superannuation, which 
consists of compulsory and voluntary contributions; and other private savings, 
such as property investments.  
 
The focus of the debate over the future of the retirement income system is on the 
relative importance attached to the age pension as opposed to occupational 
superannuation. The age pension was first introduced in Australia in 1909 in 
response to destitution among the aged. The basic policy objective was to ensure 
adequate levels of income for those who had reached retirement age (King, 
Baekgaard and Harding 1999). Unlike many schemes that developed overseas, 
the age pension in Australia was not based on income-related contributions 
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made during a person’s working life. Rather, the age-pension was (and is) 
funded from general taxation revenue. As at September 2000, the maximum 
weekly pension rate for an individual and a couple was $197.05 and $328.90, 
respectively. The rates are indexed to inflation and are legislated to equal 25 per 
cent of male average total weekly earnings (MATWE) (40 per cent in the case of 
couples). 
 
When first introduced the demand for the age pension was expected to be low. In 
the early 1900s life expectancy at birth was 55.2 years for men and 58.8 years for 
women (Beal and McKeown, 2001). Today life expectancy at birth is around 75.9 
years for men and 81.5 years for women (ABS 3302.0). Together with falling 
fertility rates, this demographic change challenges the capacity of governments 
to fund retirement income needs from general tax revenue. Private occupational 
superannuation is now actively promoted by the Federal government as an 
alternative to reliance on the age-pension. 
 
Although occupational superannuation schemes have been in operation within 
Australia for more than 50 years, prior to the early 1980s they were essentially 
confined to male professionals, managers and public servants. Significant 
expansion of the system to other occupational groups occurred during the  
Accord era of the 1980s when superannuation provisions were incorporated into 
awards and superannuation was used as a means of granting (deferred) wage 
increases while, at the same time, avoiding contributing to inflation. Following 
the introduction of the SGC in 1992, superannuation arrangements were further 
extended. Under this Act employers have to make a minimum contribution to an 
approved superannuation scheme. 
 
The initial compulsory contribution rate under the SGC was 3 per cent of gross 
earnings. Over the 1990s the mandatory contribution grate was gradually raised 
(currently it is equal to 8 per cent). By 2003 it will equal 9 per cent. No further 
adjustments are provided for at this stage. A number of individuals are not 
covered by the SGC legislation. They include individuals who are: paid less than 
$450 per calendar month; in paid employment and are over 70 years old; and in 
paid employment, under 18 years old and do not work more than 30 hours per 
week.ii  
 
Since the introduction of the SGC there has been a significant increase in the 
coverage of superannuation arrangements. For example, in 1990, 61.5 and 55.7 
per cent of men and women employed full-time were covered by a 
superannuation scheme. By 1999 the corresponding shares had increased to 96.7 
and 97.3 per cent respectively (ABS Cat. 6334.0 and 6310.0). 
 
 4
This growth in superannuation coverage is expected to produce substantial 
changes in the sources of retirement income relied on by retirees. It is expected 
that a large proportion of future generations of older Australians will be less 
reliant on the age pension and more able to partly or fully self-fund their 
retirement income needs (Department of Family and Community Services, 1999). 
 
This change will, however, occur from a base where there is heavy reliance on 
the age pension. As shown in Table 1, government transfers, such as the age 
pension, are currently the principal source of income for most retirees. This is 
especially the case for women. In 1995/96, 72.0 per cent of women of retirement 
age, as compared to 65.1 per cent of men, relied on government transfers for their 
principal source of income. 
 
Table 1: Principal source of annual income, 1995/96 













Men       
 65-69 9.3 56.3 13.3 14.4 9.5 100 
 70-74 2.2 65.9 14.3 14.5 2.2 100 
 75+ 1.5 73.2 9.1 14.7 1.9 100 
 Total 4.5 65.1 12.1 14.5 4.7 100 
       
Women       
 60-65 14.4 59.7 2.7 16.7 6.4 100 
 65-69 2.7 69.0 5.7 19.8 2.8 100 
 70-74 0.7 77.1 5.3 13.5 3.5 100 
 75+ - 79.6 5.1 13.9 1.3 100 
 Total 4.1 72.0 4.7 15.8 3.3 100 
Source: ABS Income Distribution Survey 1996/97 
 
Furthermore, the changes in the retirement income system are occurring in an 
environment where income levels are low and substantial gender inequities exist. 
In 1996 approximately one fifth of Australians age over 65 lived in poverty (King, 
1999) and almost one third of Australia’s poor were aged over 65 (King, Walker 
and Harding, 1999).  In financial year 1997/98, amongst those aged 65 or more, 
56 per cent of single people received less than $200 per week, while 60 per cent of 
couples received a joint income of less than $400 per week (ABS 6523.0).  Low 
income levels are particularly skewed towards women. Table 2 reports the ratio 
of average income levels of women relative to men. Women’s constrained access 
to private sources of income such as superannuation and other savings has 
contributed to a gender income gap of 35 per cent amongst those aged between 































Source: ABS Income Distribution Survey 1996/97. 
 
The key concern for the remainder of this paper is whether the shift towards a 
retirement income system where the emphasis is on ‘self-funded’ retirement 
(occupational superannuation) is likely to exacerbate the gender inequities 
outlined above.  In particular, we are interested in understanding (and 
demonstrating) why women have a limited capacity to make private provision 
for retirement, even within the context of a system which provides compulsory 
employer contributions. 
 
3. Modelling Superannuation Accumulation 
 
An individual’s ability to accumulate a pool of savings for their retirement is 
heavily dependent on their income level and expenditure needs during their 
working life. It is well documented that a person who is relatively disadvantaged 
in the labour market during their working life will remain relatively 
disadvantaged in retirement (Thompson, 1999; Rosenman and Wincour, 1994; 
Knox and Piggott, 1993; and Cox, 1994).   
 
High income translates into both a higher level of compulsory superannuation 
contribution and a greater ability to engage in voluntary forms of retirement 
savings (e.g. via personal contributions to superannuation funds). High income 
also increases an individual’s ability to take advantage of tax concessions for 
personal superannuation contributions.  Indeed, data from the ABS Survey of 
Employment Arrangements and Superannuation (6361.0) clearly shows that 37.9 per 
cent of individuals cite cost and affordability as the main reason for not 
personally contributing to a superannuation fund; only 0.8 per cent cite 
inadequate tax concessions.  
 
A key difference between women and men in Australia is their average level of 
income. The lifetime earnings of women typically fall well below those of men. 
For example, estimates from Harding (1991) show that the gross lifetime income 
of women is approximately 63.4 per cent of men’s. This income gap may be 
attributed to differences in women’s and men’s participation in the paid 
workforce over their lives; differences in their average hours of work; their 
different average levels of education; the different rates of pay for work of equal 
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worth; and occupational differences. The different roles that men and women 
take on within the family play a large role in explaining a number of the different 
workforce characteristics of men and women. For example, the role that women 
take on in parenting young children is critical to their lower levels of workforce 
participation. 
 
In this section a micro-simulation approach is used to give greater information 
on the linkages between women’s patterns of paid work and their 
superannuation savings under the current set of legislative provisions. The 
simulation exercise first estimates the probable lifetime earnings of a number of 
typical women and, second, computes the associated lump-sum and retirement 
private pension (derived from the purchase of an annuity).  Comparisons are 
drawn between the estimates of the retirement incomes of women with different 
degrees of attachment to the paid workforce. The different estimates serve to 
highlight the importance of education, occupation of employment, hours of 
employment as well as timing and length of exits from the paid workforce, in a 
retirement income system where the emphasis is on self-funded retirement.  
 
Data and Approach 
 
Estimates of the amount of savings an individual could accumulate under 
particular occupational superannuation arrangements requires data on: the 
lifetime earnings of the individual; information on the proportion of their income 
devoted to superannuation at different stages of their working life; as well as 
estimates of rates of return on these investments net of taxes, fees etc. As will be 
shown below, each of these prerequisites raise issues about appropriate sources 
of data and the use of these data to forecast future outcomes for individuals with 
different economic, social and demographic characteristics. 
 
Estimates of Lifetime Earnings 
 
Estimation of lifetime earnings for the purposes of this micro simulation exercise 
basically involves identifying patterns of earnings across the careers of 
individuals with different characteristics. Longitudinal data, which traces the 
experience of individuals over extended periods of time, would be ideal for such 
a purpose. However, such data are, as yet, unavailable in Australia and, thus, 
alternative approaches to this part of the estimation problem must be sought. 
 
In the absence of such data we derive estimates of lifetime earnings using data 
from the ABS 1996/97 Income Distribution Survey (IDS96). The procedure involves 
three steps. First we identify the average annual ‘starting’ salaries of a typical 
young person (aged 20) who works full-time (35 hours or more per week), 
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resides in a metropolitan area and was born in Australian.iii In 1996 the average 
annual wage for such a person was $20,997. The starting salaries of men are 
inflated by 10.5 percent to take account of current gender-based wage 
differences.iv  
 
In the second stage of the estimation process, the IDS96 data set is used to 
generate a set of separate wage equations for men and women employed full-
time. In these models we control for level of education, years of potential labour 
market experience, birthplace, marital status, presence and age of dependent 
children. The full details of these models, together with the results, are presented 
in Appendix A. 
 
The coefficient estimates on labour market experience from these models are 
used in the third stage of the estimation process to generate a set of age-earning 
profiles for men and women employed full-time.v  We do this by combining the 
coefficient estimates on the experience variable from the earnings equations with 
the information on estimated average starting salaries ($20,997 for women and 
$23,203 for men).  The resultant profiles are summarised in  columns 2 and 3 the 
following table.vi  By discounting the projected earnings figures by a factor of 
24/38.5 (which represents the common ratio of part - time to full-time hours) we 
are able to estimate the level of part-time earnings of women at different ages 
(see column 5 of Table 3).vii 
 
 
Table 3: Estimated Average Annual Earnings, Disaggregated by Age, Sex and Labour 










Time Earnings for 
Women 
 $ $ % $ 
aged 20-24 24788 22522 91 14039 
aged 25-29 28825 26105 91 16273 
aged 30-34 32282 29056 90 18113 
aged 35-39 34809 31045 89 19353 
aged 40-44 36129 31830 88 19842 
aged 45-49 36083 31307 87 19516 
aged 50-54 34667 29528 85 18407 
aged 55-59 32030 26697 83 16643 
aged 60-64 28452 23131 81 14419 
  
 
Importantly, this estimation procedure can be repeated for particular sub-groups 
in the population to identify a range of different experience-earnings profiles. For 
example, the regression analysis can be restricted to individuals with higher 
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levels of qualifications. The models can also be estimated to identify the earning 
profiles for, say, migrant women and women who live in rural areas. 
  
We believe this approach to estimating a lifetime earnings profile is the best 
alternative available and it enables us to maximise the value of the information 
on the individual characteristics that affect earnings in the IDS96 data set. 
However, we do acknowledge several limitations still exist with the data and 
approach. First, using one year’s survey data to estimate lifetime earnings 
requires that some assumptions are made about the rate of earnings growth over 
time. We assume that the real rate of earnings will remain constant at 1996 levels.  
We also assume the absence of any productivity growth (e.g. associated with 
growth in overall levels of GDP).  Thus, any observed earnings growth over time 
has been entirely attributed to the effects of enhanced skills and knowledge (as 
reflected in length of labour market experience). In reality the future pattern of 
wage growth may be different from this scenario.viii  
 
A second limitation is that our calculations are based on gross wage rates. No 
allowance has been made for the personal income tax rates that apply to 
individuals with different income levels. This feature of the estimation process 
will tend to overestimate the level of earnings inequality, for example, between 
men and women. However, as superannuation contributions are based on gross 
income, the distortion caused to comparisons of superannuation savings will be 
minimal.  
 
Third, the estimates are based on an assumption that current rates of return to 
labour market attributes such as experience will remain constant over time. This 
also may not be realised and, as a result, actual levels of earnings and 
superannuation savings may differ from those predicted here. 
 
 
Estimates of Superannuation Savings 
 
As mentioned above, the amount of superannuation savings that an individual 
accumulates by the time of their retirement will be a function of their lifetime 
earnings, the proportion of their income they devote to superannuation over 
their working life and the rate of return on these savings. Thus, to estimate the 
level of superannuation savings that an individual with particular characteristics 
accumulates we combine the above estimates of lifetime earnings with several 
assumptions about the nature of and returns to the individual’s superannuation 
savings. These assumptions, which are based on current regulatory 
arrangements and rates of return, are as follows: 
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• Contributions to superannuation savings comprise only the minimum 
amounts mandated by the SGC.ix The SGC will be fully phased in by July 
2002, at which time the rate of compulsory contributions will be set at 9 per 
cent. 
• Earnings in the superannuation funds increase at a real rate of interest equal 
to 3.25 per cent per annum.x  
• A 15 per cent tax is levied on contributions. No allowance is made for a 
superannuation surcharge or other taxes (including taxes on retirement 
income). 
• The preservation age for women and men is 65 years. 
• Women re-entering the workforce after a career break commence at the 
hourly rate they were on prior to leaving employment. 
 
Factors relating to these assumptions are applied to our estimates of earnings to 
generate predictions about the level of superannuation savings of Australian 
men and women 
 
 
Stereotypes to Demonstrate the Effects of Wage Differences and Labour Force 
Attachment on Superannuation Savings 
 
To simplify the description of the effects of wage rates and working patterns on 
superannuation savings we define five stereotypical individuals and identify 
their levels of savings. All the individuals were born in Australia and reside in a 
metropolitan area. They include: 
 
• John and Tracey: They both enter the workforce at the age of 20 in 2000 and 
work continuously, on a full-time basis, until they retire at the age of 65 (in 2045). 
John and Tracey both have average levels of education. 
 
• Sandra: She has the same level of education and age of entry to the labour 
market as Tracey. However, her workforce history differs in that she 
withdraws from the workforce at the age of 27 to have her first child and remains 
out of the workforce until she is 34 (and her second child is 5 years old). 
Sandra returns to work on a full-time basis and does not retire until she is 65. 
 
• Valerie: To simplify the comparisons across the individuals, Valerie also has 
the same level of education and age of entry to the labour market as Tracey. 
Her distinguishing characteristic is that, although she also spends the years 
from when she is 27 to when she is 34 out of the workforce, she returns to work 
on a part-time basis (working continuously on this basis until 65). 
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• Audrey: She also has the same general characteristics of the other women. 




The following diagram (figure 1) identifies the estimated earnings of these five 
individuals over their careers, whilst the Table 4 provides a comparison of their 























Table 4: Gross lifetime earnings and superannuation for five stereotypical individuals 

























John $1,440,000 100% - $233,000 100% - 
Tracey $1,256,000 87% 100% $206,000 88% 100% 
Sandra $924,000 64% 74% $144,000 62% 70% 
Valerie $637,000 44% 51% $106,000 45% 51% 
Audrey $163,000 11% 13% $43,000 19% 21% 
Assumption: all individuals commence work at age 20 in 2000 and retire at age 65 if in the paid workforce 
at that time.  The dollar estimates reported here are real dollars at 1996 levels. 
 
 
Workforce Attachment and Superannuation Accumulation 
 
The differences in the lifetime earnings and superannuation savings of the five 
individuals reflect the impact of several labour market features and their 
relationship with superannuation outcomes. The gross lifetime earnings of 
Tracey, for example, are 13 per cent lower than John’s. Her superannuation 
savings are 12 per cent lower than John’s. The observed gap between John and 
Tracey is the product of two forces: (a) a gender wage gap in the earnings of 
males and females employed full-time; and (b) a gender gap in the rate of return 
to additional years of labour market experience. The outcomes are net of the 
effects of other factors known to affect earnings (such as, education, hours of 
work, birthplace and other demographic characteristics such as marital status 
and children). The comparison of John and Tracey thus highlights the 
importance of labour market discrimination for women’s relative income both 
pre- and post-retirement.  
 
The comparison of Sandra’s lifetime earnings with that of Tracey’s highlights the 
large financial cost borne by women when they leave the workforce to care for 
children. Sandra’s lifetime earnings are reduced by 26 per cent by the seven-year 
absence from work. The impact on her post-retirement income is even more 
dramatic, as this falls by 30 per cent, due to the lost contributions and the benefits 
of compound interest at a relatively early stage of her retirement savings. 
 
The lifetime earnings and superannuation savings of Valerie clearly demonstrate 
the influence of extended periods of part-time employment. Part-time 
employment is often used as a way of combining work and family 
responsibilities (see Austen and Birch, 2001). The gross lifetime earnings of 
Valerie relative to Sandra are equal to 69 per cent. However, because Valerie was 
able to make superannuation investments during the early part of her career 
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when she was employed full-time, her overall level of superannuation on 
retirement is equal to 74 per cent of the equivalent amount accumulated by 
Sandra. The estimates, therefore, show that if women are able to accumulate 
superannuation contributions in the early part of their careers, the disadvantage 
in terms of their retirement incomes caused by part time work, although large, 
can be less than the loss in lifetime earnings. The result reflects the effects of 
compounded interest, where earnings (interest payments) are reinvested and 
compounded over a longer period of time to increase final returns. 
 
As could be expected Audrey’s absence from the workforce after childbirth has a 
dramatic impact on her lifetime earnings and superannuation savings. Over her 
lifetime she earns 18 per cent of the lifetime earnings that flow to Sandra. The 
level of superannuation accumulated by Audrey equals 30 per cent of the level 
accumulated by Sandra. Again, the difference in these figures reflects the 
influence of early contributions to superannuation. 
 
The Role of Education and Occupational Status on Superannuation Savings 
 
Thus far we have used information on men and women with average (high 
school) levels of education to generate our lifetime earning profiles and to 
estimate the impact of labour force attachment on superannuation. Rates of 
return to additional years of labour market experience are, however, affected by 
education and occupation. Degree holders, for example, are more likely to be 
employed in a professional capacity than persons who left school without 
completing high school. Their earning profiles will be both higher (higher initial 
starting wage) and steeper (faster rate of growth) (Miller, 1982). Over their 
lifetime, such individuals are likely to accumulate higher levels of earnings and 
superannuation. 
 
To examine the effects of education and occupational status on superannuation 
savings, separate wage equations were estimated using the IDS96 data for three 
stereotypical individuals: (a) a professional man (Bruce); (b) a professional 
woman (Deirdre); and ( c) a woman employed as a cleaner (Fiona). The 
coefficient estimates on labour market experience from these regressions were  
combined with information on the starting salaries of these individuals to 
construct age-earning profiles for our new set of hypothetical individuals. The 
profiles are illustrated in figure 2 below.xi  
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Table 5 shows the gross lifetime income of the professionals (Bruce and Deirdre) 
and our cleaner (Fiona), together with estimates of their superannuation 
accumulation at retirement. It should be noted that we employ a rather extreme 
assumption here in that we assume that all these individuals work on a full-time 
continuous basis until retirement at age 65. Our aim at this stage is simply to 
highlight the effects of education and occupational attainment on women’s 
lifetime earnings and retirement income.  
 
The results show that the higher earnings of our professional woman (Deirdre) 
has allowed her to accumulate a level of superannuation that is 13 per cent 
higher than that accumulated by a woman with an average level of 
education/occupational status (such as Tracey). The level of superannuation 
accumulated by Fiona, a cleaner, is almost 40 per cent less than Tracey’s. 
 
 
Table 4: Gross lifetime earnings and superannuation for different occupational groups 











% of Tracey’s 
total super. 
 
Bruce - Professional $1,688,000 134% $273,000 133% 
Deirdre – Professional $1,426,000 114% $234,000 113% 
Tracey – Average $1,256,000 100% $206,000 100% 
Fiona – Cleaner $751,000 60% $125,000 61% 
Assumption: all individuals commence work at age 20 in 2000 and are employed on a full-time continuous 
basis until retirement at age 65 in 2045. The dollar estimates reported here are real dollars at 1996 levels. 
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Table 6 re-estimates the lifetime earnings and superannuation levels for the three 
women (Deirdre, Tracey and Fiona) taking into account a seven year career 
break. Two sets of comparisons are presented. One assumes a career break 
between the age of 27-34. The other delays child-birth and assumes a seven year 
career break between the age of 32-39. The objective of the exercise is twofold: (a) 
to show, as before, how periods of labour market absence impact on the earnings 
of different representative women; and (b) to demonstrate how the timing of 
children impacts on outcomes. 
 
 
Table 6: Effects of delaying children on earnings and superannuation. 
  Gross Lifetime Earnings Superannuation Accumulation  
  if has a career 
break age  
27-34 





if has a career 
break  
age 27-34 
if has a career 






$1,059,000 $1,111,000 4.9% $164,000 $178,000 8.5% 
Tracey 
 (Average) 
$924,000 $973,000 5.3% $144,000 $156,000 8.3% 
Fiona 
 (Cleaner) 
$617,000 $625,000 1.3% $96,000 $101,000 5.2% 
 
A comparison of the results in Tables 5 and 6 shows that when Deirdre, a 
professional woman, has a seven year career break between the ages of 27 and 
34, her final superannuation or lump-sum is 30 per cent lower than her 
counterpart who has no career break. If she were to delay childbirth (e.g. assume 
a 7 year exit between the ages of 32 and 39) her relative lifetime earnings would 
increase by 4.9 per cent, while her superannuation funds would grow by 8.5 per 
cent (see Table 6). The result derives from the loss in workforce experience 
during a period of relatively high earnings growth and reduced capacity to gain 
from compounded interest payments. The effect is smaller for less qualified 
women and those in low paid jobs (such as cleaning). 
 
Other Determinants of Superannuation Savings 
 
Birthplace and Location 
Clearly there are numerous other factors that will combine to affect the level of 
earnings and superannuation funds accumulated by women. For example, 
women born in non-English speaking countries earn around 7.4 per cent less 
than women born in Australia (Preston 2001, p.157). Indigenous women earn 
considerably less than non-indigenous women. It is beyond the scope of these 
paper to take all these other factors into consideration except to say that these 
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The age of retirement and number of years contributing to the fund will also, 
clearly, affect levels of funds accumulated. One group that is particularly at risk 
in the near-future is the ‘baby boom’ generation (comprised of people born 
between 1946 and 1964). At the time of the introduction of the SGC in 1992, the 
oldest baby boomers were aged 46 and the youngest aged 28. Table 7 shows 
estimated levels of superannuation that our ‘average’ hypothetical individuals 
(John, Tracey, Sandra, Valerie and Audrey) could expect to accumulate 
depending on their age at the time of the introduction of the SGC.  Estimates are 
all provided in real 1996 dollars. Column 3 shows levels of superannuation that 
might be generated if the individual was covered by the SGC throughout their 
entire working life; column 4 shows estimates for ‘young baby boomers’ (those 
aged 20 in 1984); column 5 shows estimates for ‘old baby boomers’ (those aged 
20 in 1966).  
 
 









Total Super.b  
Accum. for  




 Accum. for  
‘old’ BBs  
$(‘000) 
 
John – FT $1,440,000 $233,000 $149,000 $46,000 
Tracey – FT $1,256,000 $206,000 $129,000 $39,000 
Sandra  
  (FT, break, FT) 
$924,000 $144,000 $95,000 $33,000 
Valerie  
  (FT, break, PT) 
$637,000 $106,000 $59,000 $21,000 
Audrey  
  (FT, break, out) 
$163,000 $43,000 $0 $0 
Real dollars at 1996 levels. Notes: In all cases it is assumed that the individuals started work at age 20. In 
the case of: (a) aged 20 in 2000; (b) age 20 in 1984; (c) age 20 in 1966. 
 
 
Under the SGC, and assuming no change in the employer contribution rate of 9 
per cent post 2003, the most that a ‘young’ average baby-boomer who has had 
time out of the labour market and has returned to part-time employment could 
expect to accumulate would be $59,000 (see Valerie). If the same person was an 




The Legal Framework 
 
The legal framework associated with the current superannuation system also has 
an important effect on the level of superannuation funds generated under the 
SGC. For example, under existing legislation employers are not required to make 
compulsory superannuation contributions for employees earnings less than $450 
in a calendar month.xii The level of compulsory contributions to superannuation 
and taxation arrangements also impacts on the level of superannuation savings. 
 
To examine the impact of the ‘$450 per month’ rule on the retirement incomes of 
some women we use Valerie (our part-time worker) and assume that she works 
24 hours a week in two jobs (rather than one). In one job she earns $449 in a 
calendar month and is, therefore, not entitled to superannuation on those 
earnings. The results of this simulation are shown in Table 8. Although Valerie’s 
gross lifetime earnings remain unchanged, her level of superannuation at 
retirement is 20 per cent lower. 
 
 
Table 8: Effect of the $450 threshold on levels of superannuation. 
 Valerie 




with 2 jobs:  




Gross lifetime earnings $637,000 $637,000 0% 
Superannuation accumulation $106,000 $84,000 -20% 
 
One way to raise savings for retirement would be to legislate for a higher rate of 
compulsory contribution. When fully implemented (in 2003) the SGC will 
provide for a level of mandatory employer contributions equal to 9 per cent. The 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) is, however, currently 
lobbying the government to raise the level of compulsory contributions to 12 per 
cent.  
 
Table 9 demonstrates the effects that this change in compulsory contributions 
would have on the overall level of superannuation savings. It is assumed that the 
movement towards the 12 per cent contribution rate would be gradual: for 
example, 10 per cent in 2005 and 2006, rising to 11 per cent in 2007 and 2008, and 
12 per cent in 2009. The estimates show that an increase in the compulsory 
savings rate would deliver significant increases in the superannuation funds 
accumulated by individuals eligible for superannuation. For example, Valerie 
(who works part-time and has a 7 year career break), would see a 20.8 per cent 
increase in her superannuation savings over her lifetime. 
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Table 9: Effects of an increase in compulsory savings from 9% to 12% 
 John Tracey Sandra Valerie Audrey 
Gross superannuation accumulated 
under current arrangements 
 
$233,000 $206,000 $144,000 $106,000 $43,000 
Gross superannuation with a 
gradual increase in the rate from 
9% to 12%  
$295,000 $260,000 $178,000 $128,000 $45,000 
 











Note: the estimates here are for a representative person aged 20 in 2000. The assumed age of retirement is 
65. 
 
ASFA have also called for a removal of the 15 per cent government tax on 
compulsory contributions by employers. Their estimates suggest that this would 
add $55,000 to a lump-sum, although it is not entirely clear what assumptions 
under-pin their estimate and precisely who would accumulate the additional 
$55,000.xiii  Table 10 shows how a removal of this tax would affect our five 
‘average’ representative people. John, an ‘average’ Australian born male who 
works on a full-time continuous basis from age 20 to 65 would accumulate an 
additional $41,000 (18%) over his lifetime following a removal of the 15 per cent 
tax. Valerie, would increase her superannuation savings by 17 per cent, or 
$18,000. 
 
Table 10:Effects of a removal of the 15% tax on compulsory contributions 
 John Tracey Sandra Valerie Audrey 
Gross superannuation accumulated 
under current arrangements  
 
$233,000 $206,000 $144,000 $106,000 $43,000 
Gross superannuation 
accumulated with the removal of 
the 15% tax on compulsory 
contributions 
 
$274,000 $242,000 $169,000 $124,000 $51,000 
Actual Change ($’000) 
 
$41,000 $36,000 $25,000 $18,000 $8,000 
Percentage change (%) 18% 17% 17% 17% 19% 
Note: the estimates here are for a representative person aged 20 in 2000. The assumed age of retirement is 
65. Real 1996 dollars. 
 
Finally, the retirement income of individuals who are married or in other long-
term relationships will be affected by the sharing of resources and assets within 
the family. Some individuals may choose to save for retirement through 
contributions to shared assets (such as the family home) and/or supporting a 
partner’s career and, thus, the family’s future income. However, such options are 
prone to the risks associated with marriage breakdown and, thus, retirement 
incomes are also affected by laws relating to the division of assets, including 
superannuation in the event of divorce. 
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5. Adequacy Assessment 
 
Thus far we have derived estimates of the level of superannuation for a range of 
different individuals/scenarios. These estimates have highlighted the importance 
of factors relating to workforce attachment, education, occupation, other 
determinants of wages and legislative provisions to the level of superannuation 
savings. However, we have yet to comment on whether the estimated levels of 
superannuation are sufficient to fund the income needs of retirees. 
 
Assessing the adequacy of the level of retirement income generated under 
occupational superannuation arrangements is difficult. Answers as to how much 
is needed for retirement vary considerably from a minimum of 25 per cent of 
male average weekly total earnings (AWTE) to 100 per cent of pre-retirement 
income. However, most financial planners suggest that 75 per cent of pre-
retirement earnings is a good retirement income target. 
 
In this section we refrain from providing specific income targets, as the funds 
required in retirement will clearly vary across individuals depending on their set 
of circumstances and access to other financial/liquid assets (such as, private 
savings and home ownership). Our approach, instead, involves estimating the 
present value of an annuity (a series of regular, for example, annual payments) 
which will flow to an individual following conversion of a lump-sum payment 
from a superannuation fund. This is then compared to the income level that is 
currently provided by the maximum level of the age pension. 
 
The annuity that is used in our calculation results in complete exhaustion of the 
lump-sum by the time of death. As before, we base our calculations on our 
representative individuals who retire at 65. 
 
The formula used to compute the present value of an annuity with the principal 








where: r measures the real rate of interest (as before, assumed to be equal to 3.25 
per cent); A is the lifetime annuity purchased with a lump sum from the 
superannuation fund at retirement (we assume that the lump sum is not subject 
to tax); and n measures the number of payments. We base our number of 
payments on the expected years of life in the post-retirement period. Based on 
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current life expectancies for Australian men and women, n is equal to 11 years 
for men and 17 years for women.xiv There is no adjustment for inflation; 
estimates provided are in real 1996 dollars. Table 11 shows the annual payments 
that would flow from various lump-sum investments.   
 
 
Table 11: Present value of superannuation annuities 




       
Lump-sum 
investeda 
















Notes: (a) the amounts shown here are for general assessment purposes. They correspond closely 
to the gross superannuation accumulated by our representative individuals: John ($233,000); 
Tracey ($206,000); Sandra ($144,000); Valerie ($106,000) and Audrey ($43,000). 
 
 
The gender difference apparent in a comparison of Tracey and John’s outcomes 
reflects, in large part, differences in the life expectancies of men and women. If 
we were to assume that John would also live for 17 years post retirement (rather 
than 9), the annuity that he could purchase with his lump-sum of $250,000 would 
only deliver an annual income stream of $19,372. 
 
To assess the adequacy of these annuities we compare them to income levels 
available under the age pension. The maximum age pension, as indicated earlier, 
is equal to 25 per cent of male ATWE, or $8753 per annum in 1996.  
 
The estimates show that, under the current arrangements for superannuation, 
Valerie (who has a seven year career break and returns to the paid workforce on 
a part-time basis working 24 hours per week until retirement at age 65) would, in 
the absence of any other income source (such as the age pension), have an 
income stream in retirement roughly equivalent to the current age pension. In 
other words, without making additional private savings (either in the form of 
superannuation or through other forms of investment such as property), 
Valerie’s capacity to generate a retirement income above the minimum is 
considerably constrained within the SGC (compulsory) occupational 
superannuation system. In the absence of other sources of income, Audrey (who 
leaves the paid workforce at age 27 and never returns) would have a private 
pension equal to around one third of that provided by the age pension.  The 
results also suggest that many ‘baby boomers’ will have little in the way of a 
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private pension and will continue to depend on the age pension (either in part or 
in full) during their retirement years. 
 
The significance of these results lie in the fact that Valerie’s and Audrey’s labour 
force characteristics are similar to many Australian women’s. For example, data 
on participation arrangements and working hour arrangements show that, of all 
women aged 35 or more, around 24 per cent are in full-time employment, a 
further 21 per cent are in part-time employment (the majority of these women 
work less than 29 hours per week). The balance, 55 per cent, of women aged over 
35 are not in paid employment (ABS Cat No. 6203).  Given these estimates our 
modest assumptions may still be rather extreme. We assume, for example, that 
Valerie returns to part-time employment (24 hours per week) until retirement at 
age 65. 
 
In summary our findings indicate that, in the absence of a significant change in 
the employment patterns of women, their outcomes under a fully matured 9 per 
cent Superannuation Guarantee accumulation arrangement will be equivalent, 
on average, to the full age pension.  
 
Government predictions suggest that the SGC will not significantly change the 
number of retirees claiming the age pension, although the new arrangements 
could be expected to increase the number receiving only a part pension (see 
Gallery, Brown and Gallery, 1996, for further discussion).  Estimates presented in 
this paper suggest that many women with weak attachment to the workforce will 
remain dependent on the full age pension (assuming no other sources of income, 
such as spouse’s superannuation or personal savings). Other women with a 
strong attachment to the workforce, albeit in a part-time capacity, will also be 
heavily dependent on the government age pension system in retirement.  As at 
July 2000 the maximum fortnightly income a single person could receive and still 
be eligible for the full age pension was $106 per fortnight or  $2756 per annum. 
The pension disqualifying income limit for a single person was $1087 per 
fortnight ($28,262 per annum).xv  
 
The results thus highlight the need to ensure that changes in the retirement 
income system are broad based and designed to benefit all members of the 
community.  Whilst tax concessions aimed at encouraging private savings are 
laudable, they should not be made at the expense of the age pension.  
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper uses a number of micro-simulations to assess how a shift towards a 
retirement income system centred on occupational superannuation might impact 
on the economic well-being of women and those with intermittent patterns of 
labour market activity. It is frequently argued that increased workforce 
attachment (even if in part-time work) together with the SGC, should 
substantially improve the financial circumstances of women in retirement.  
 
The results of the micro-simulations detailed in this paper, however, caution 
against such generalisations. Women who are employed on a part-time basis 
throughout most of their working life, or who have extended period of absence 
from the workforce, will struggle to achieve income levels in retirement 
equivalent to the current full age pension.  Removal of the $450 threshold level 
and the 15 per cent employer contribution tax could make a significant difference 
to the level of superannuation funds accumulated by some Australian women.   
 
There is, however, a need to broaden the current debate over retirement incomes 
away from a narrow focus on superannuation. Many women with a weak 
attachment to the workforce will remain heavily dependent on the government 
age pension in retirement. There is a danger that the current policy shift in 
favour of compulsory savings in private superannuation schemes will see a 
magnification of current retirement income inequities and a retreat by 
government from its obligations to all retirees. 
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Determinants of Relative Earnings of Men and Women Employed Full-Time. 
 Women Men 
 Coef t-stat. proportio
n in each 
group (%) 
Coef t-stat. proportio
n in each 
group 
(%) 
constant 5.770 313.999  5.741 303.190  
Skilled 
certificate 
0.141 9.217 0.21 0.166 13.700 0.38 
Degree or 
higher 
0.447 28.230 0.20 0.444 27.255 0.16 
Experience 0.038 17.500 17.44 0.039 18.625 19.19 
Experience2 
/100 
-0.084 -15.765 4.34 -0.074 -16.183 4.97 
Overtime 
work 
0.096 7.761 0.57 0.163 13.127 0.74 
Married 0.058 3.561 0.55 0.131 7.425 0.68 
Wid.sep.div 0.094 3.951 0.11 0.085 3.077 0.06 
Kids0-4 0.024 0.934 0.06 -0.021 -1,262 0.18 
Kids5-9 -0.044 -1.892 0.08 -0.101 -0.717 0.18 
Kids10-15 -0.119 -6.134 0.13 -0.024 -1.541 0.18 
Migrant -0.068 -4.766 0.24 -0.032 -2.478 0.26 
       
Mean ln(Y) 6.264   6.445   
Adjust R2 0.310   0.269   
Observations 3202   5866   
Source: estimates derived from the ABS 1996/97 IDS. The sample is restricted to persons 
employed full-time as a wage and salary earner. Full-time is defined as more than 35 
hours per week. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of weekly earnings in 
main job. The sample is also restricted to those employed in one job only. See above for 












i  Tax expenditures on superannuation are projected to rise to $12bn in 2004-05, up from 
$9bn in 2001-02. Over the same period the cost of the Age Pension is projected to rise from $16bn 
to $19bn (Budget Papers 2001). 
ii  If the individual is paid under an award it may state that the employer must contribute 
to a superannuation fund, even if the individual earns less than $450 a calendar month. 
iii  We control for these characteristics and later relax some of the assumptions, such as 
birthplace and geographic location, as a way of showing that life-time earnings and 
superannuation contributions also vary by such parameters. 
iv  Estimates based on the IDS96 data base show that the adjusted (i.e. controlling for 
characteristics such as education, experience and other factors known to affect earnings ) average 
gender wage gap in Australia in the full-time labour market is around 10.5 per cent (Preston 
2000).  We acknowledge that this gap will be lower amongst junior workers (e.g. those aged 20). 
Miller and Rummery (1991), for example, estimate that the adjusted gender wage gap amongst 
19-25 year olds is 4.9 per cent. There are, however, very few studies available where the adjusted 
gender wage gap has been estimated for different age groups. Accordingly, we apply the overall 
average to our estimates here. The limitation of this approach is that it may overstate the 
earnings of young men. However, the focus of our study is primarily on comparisons amongst 
women rather than comparisons between men and women. With this in mind we believe that the 
approach adopted is reasonable. 
v  One weakness with the IDS data (a weakness shared by many other data sets) is the lack 
of information on actual labour market experience. Following convention ‘potential’ labour 
market experience is defined here as age minus years of schooling minus 5 (assumed aged when 
schooling commenced). It is generally acknowledged that this potential measure is a poor proxy 
for female labour market experience, on account of their intermittent labour market activity. This 
explains why the sample is restricted to persons employed full-time. An underlying assumption  
of the model is that those who are employed full-time have essentially worked full-time over 
their entire working career. For many full-time workers this is a reasonable assumption. It  
means that the estimated experience coefficients provide a reasonable approximation of the rate 
of return to  an additional year of labour market experience.  There are a number of different 
ways to adjust the potential measure to perhaps more accurately reflect the actual labour market 
experience of older women. However, research shows that the varied approaches generate mixed 
results and impart additional biases into the results (Blinder, 1976; Preston, 2001, pp14-27). In the 
absence of information on actual labour market experience variables controlling for marital 
status and the presence and age of dependant children are used to capture penalties associated 
with intermittent labour market experience.    
vi  Although we have continuous data, for simplicity and ease of presentation we have 
grouped the data into age groups with intervals of 5 years. 
vii  An acknowledged limitation with this approach is that, relative to women employed 
full-time, the experience earnings profile may be flatter for women employed part-time. One 
could try and develop some correction parameter by estimating a wage equation for part-time 
workers and calculating their rate of return to experience. However, as before, such a 
methodological has its inherent weaknesses in that it assumes that the worker has only ever held 
a part-time job. Given these methodological limitations we prefer to simplify the analysis by 
estimating part-time earnings as a proportion of full-time earnings. To the extent that there are 
differences in the experience earning profiles of women employed full-time and women 
employed part-time, our results will most likely overstate  the gross life-time earnings of part-time 
workers and their resultant levels of superannuation. 
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viii  The Accord era (1980s), for example, is widely seen as having led to a reduction in the 
real wage of many labour market participants. 
ix  This assumption is fairly reasonable. According to ABS data collected in 2000, only 18.7 
per cent of women in employment have superannuation funds which consist of personal/spouse 
contributions and employer/business contributions. (Amongst men the corresponding share is 
25.2 per cent) (ABS 6361.0, Table 15). 
x  This equates to the standard investment real rate of interest recommended by the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) for use when calculating investment 
returns on a balanced style investment portfolio. 
xi  The wage relativities were taken from Preston (1998). Using 1991 Census data Preston 
shows that professional men earn 17.2 per cent more than the average for all male occupations. 
The corresponding relativity for female professionals and cleaners is 15.5 and -23.0 per cent, 
respectively. 
xii  Anecdotal evidence suggests that in some industries (e.g. child-care) this rule is explicitly 
used as a device to minimise the wage bill. 
xiii  Their estimate was reported in a recent press release “ASFA warns of aged ‘underclass’ 
Australian Financial Review, 22 February 2001. 
xiv   Clearly the choice of n will vary across individuals depending on their knowledge of 
their health and attitudes to risk. Some individuals may prefer to retain some capital rather than  
completely exhaust their principal so soon after retirement. In this study n is estimated as the 
difference between life-expectancy and age of retirement (65). In the case of women n is equal to 
17. This would appear to be an appropriate factor. Research prepared by ASFA (1999) suggests 
that a factor of 19.26 years is currently used by many financial institutions for the life-expectancy 
of women.  
xv  In the most recent budget (Budget 2001) the government announced that the tax-free 
threshold for retirees would be raised to $20,000. This will ease the burden on many retirees with 
some private income (e.g. from superannuation). 
